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ABSTRACT
The Universal Serial Bus protocol was designed to be, and has become, the
single standard used for interfacing with computer peripherals and electronic
components. The proliferation of this protocol has resulted in USB power
outlets in public places being a common sight. However, the very univer-
sality of the protocol, combined with the rapidly shrinking size of computer
processors and microcontrollers, creates some rather severe security vulner-
abilities.
Plugging a USB smart device into a compromised port, even one purported
to be solely a power delivery system, can allow an attacker to perform many
different malicious actions, the range and severity of which depend on the
length of time the device remains attached, the specific type of device in
question, and the resources of the attacker. This thesis presents a survey of
the types of attacks possible against some of the most common and popular
devices, a comparison of these devices from the standpoint of defense against
these types of attacks, and possible mitigation strategies.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The USB protocol was originally designed to enable the transfer of both data
and power. The average battery life of a smart device and the wireless data
capabilities these devices possess, though, have resulted in USB connections
being more frequently used for power than for data. However, even if the
intent of the user is simply to charge the device, the potential for data transfer
is still present if the USB port being used is being driven by a processor
such as a computer or microcontroller. In the case of a home or workplace
personal computer, this is expected behavior and not necessarily cause for
concern (unless the computer has been compromised by malware); in the case
of a USB charging station which should not have such a processor, however,
this behavior can be used for malicious purposes.
1.1 Proliferation of smart devices
Smartphones in their original incarnation were referred to as personal digital
assistants, or PDAs. They were bulky, clumsy, lacked touchscreens, and were
significantly more expensive than any other type of phone. Since then, the
smartphone has evolved to the point where smartphone users outnumber
normal cellular phone users in the United States [1], with models to fit all
budgets. This is a self-reinforcing cycle, as the prevalence of smartphones has
caused developers to focus on improving smartphone technology, giving rise
to smaller, more efficient processors and better communications protocols
such as 3G and LTE; these improvements in turn create still greater demand
for smartphones.
As smartphones become a part of more people’s everyday lives, security for
them becomes more and more important. One particular problem comes in
the form of perception; cellular phones are viewed as phones, or as mobile e-
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readers, or as portable social media platforms, when they are actually small,
fully-functioning computers. And like any computer, they are susceptible to
malware and vulnerable to attacks if proper precautions are not taken.
1.2 Proliferation of USB charging stations
With the proliferation of portable, personal smart devices have come at-
tendant services being offered in public locations. It is not uncommon to
see electronic device vending machines in major airports, offering portable
batteries, headphones, or even personal electronic devices such as portable
gaming systems and music players. One such service which is becoming in-
creasingly widespread is the USB charging station or kiosk.
These kiosks are especially prevalent in areas with a large number of trav-
elers, such as airports, train stations, and hotels. There are even third-party
services offering to install and maintain these kiosks as a service [2]. These
charging options are becoming more widespread, and their prevalence and
utility are leading them to become more widely accepted in light of the in-
creasing number of travelers with smart devices in need of recharging.
1.3 Potential avenues of attack
The fact that USB supports both power and data is what leads to the threats
this thesis will analyze. Such threats can come from any USB connection
made with a smart device, whether or not the user of the device is aware
the connection is capable of being used for more than simply power. This
implies there are two different situations which must be taken into account.
The first situation is when the user is aware of the data connection abilities
of the system he or she is connecting to. In this case, attacks are caused by
prior tampering with the system, normally through infection by malware. A
system so infected can then attack a connected smart device, and is partic-
ularly insidious because any data transfer activities noticed may be ignored
as normal when they are in fact signs of an attack. The problem becomes
compounded when the fact that an infected smart device can itself infect a
host system is taken into account.
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The second situation arises when the victim connects to a USB socket solely
for the purposes of charging the smart device, ignorant of the USB host an
attacker has connected to the outlet. Such a user may or may not be paying
attention to the screen of his or her smart device in such a scenario, depending
on the level of charge in the device and other potential draws on his or her
attention. Detection of a modified charging station by simple observation is
difficult, if not impossible; any marks made by the accessing of the station’s
internals may be dismissed as normal wear, and microcomputers capable of
performing a sophisticated attack while fitting inside a very small space are
not only feasible, but available off the shelf. The Raspberry PI computer,
in particular, has USB connectivity, is very inexpensive, and is small enough
to hide easily, measuring 85.60mm x 56mm x 21mm [3]. Dedicated purpose-
built hardware could be made even smaller.
In either event, the problem becomes one of trust. Whether a device is
being trusted with or without reason, the problem remains. The following
chapters will explore what can be done when that trust is misplaced, and
what can be done to guard against the results.
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CHAPTER 2
ATTACKS AGAINST IOS DEVICES
The iPhone is, without a doubt, one of the most popular smartphones on the
market today. The iPad broke new ground and in many ways opened the door
to the current popularity of tablets. Many companies issue iPhones to their
employees or only support iPhones, citing ease of mobile device management
on the closed platform and the security the closed-source operating system
offers, as well as the productivity gains available owing to the large amount
of third-party applications available and the ease of creating applications if
none of the existing ones serve. However, the USB communication which
allows easy synchronization of emails, contacts, and other personal data also
presents vulnerabilities which may overlook.
2.1 USB interface
When connecting an iOS device, the host operating system acts as it does for
any USB device and binds the appropriate driver(s) based on the device and
vendor IDs the USB device reports, along with the device’s declared endpoint
types. For the iPhone specifically, this consists of a PTP interface (Picture
Transfer Protocol, used to access the camera’s photograph folder only), the
Apple Mobile Device interface (used to transfer media and settings), and
optionally a USB ethernet interface (used for internet tethering) [4].
2.1.1 The Picture Transfer Protocol interface
The Picture Transfer Protocol is a communication protocol, rather than
defining any particular storage method or format [5]. Because is it solely
a communication protocol, implementation of the storage back end is the
responsibility of the device, meaning that with regards to this particular
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protocol, the device is only as secure as the storage handling it presents to
the host. The Picture Transfer Protocol is employed in most devices which
have a digital camera (or are exclusively digital cameras).
While the Picture Transfer Protocol does allow for live real-time commu-
nication between the camera itself and the host computer, this functionality
is not enabled on iOS by default (there exists third-party software which
allows for this, but not via the PTP USB endpoint and as such are beyond
the scope of this thesis).
The Picture Transfer Protocol allows the connected host device sandboxed
access to the camera’s storage area only, making it mostly unsuitable for
security exploits beyond theft of photographs. However, some iOS devices,
such as the iPad, actually implement a generic USB mass storage device class
as opposed to the PTP class, and as such are considerably more vulnerable
[6].
2.1.2 The USB Ethernet interface
The Apple USB Ethernet interface offered by iOS devices presents some end-
points of the device as a vendor-specific USB device, which then requires a
specific driver for the host to populate the iOS device as an ethernet con-
nection. This interface is provided primarily for use by cellular data-enabled
devices such as the iPhone and some versions of the iPad, so that cellular
data may be used to connect to the internet in areas where a standard inter-
net connection is not available. The driver used on both Windows and Mac
OSX is Apple’s proprietary driver; however, open source versions which are
compatible with Linux are available [7].
It is interesting to note that while support for internet tethering is native
to iOS, it requires support from the cellular network provider and is routed
through a different system than normal device-based cellular data traffic so
that tethered internet traffic can be tracked (and billed) separately. Since cel-
lular data providers charge an additional fee for this service, there are several
options available for jailbroken devices which configure the device to proxy
traffic from a host through the device’s built-in cellular data connection, by-
passing the native device functionality as well as the service provider’s checks
on tethered data usage.
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2.1.3 The Apple Mobile Device interface
The Apple Mobile Device interface is the primary interface through which a
host computer communicates with an iOS-based smart device. On Windows
and OSX systems, it provides the interface for iTunes, Apple’s media man-
agement software; on Linux systems, open-source third party drivers use it
to provide a link to other media management software such as Rhythmbox.
On a normal, non-jailbroken iOS device, this interface provides access to
the user data partition on the device via the Apple File Connection (AFC)
service [8]. This service acts as an interface between the host computer and
the filesystem on the device. Files can be read from or written to the device
via calls to the AFC service; the AFC service also offers other filesystem
commands such as creation of symlinks and hardlinks and setting file sizes
and modification times.
Jailbroken devices
On a jailbroken device, a second service (denoted Apple File Connection
2) is installed and set to run with root permissions at boot time. This
AFC2 service is functionally identical to the AFC service, but where the
AFC service is jailed to the user data area of the device, the AFC2 service
has access to the system data partition, allowing low-level root access to
the iOS operating system itself. Effectively, jailbreaking has the end goal of
installing this service in a stable manner, because with the low-level system
access this grants any and every conceivable change to iOS itself becomes
feasible [8].
2.2 Existing attacks
The popularity of the iPhone has made it a target of many attacks, despite
Apple’s best efforts at policing their App Store and their requirement that
any installed applications be digitally signed. This is due in part to the
comparatively large number of vulnerabilities present in iOS. As recently as
March of 2013, the iPhone was found to have more vulnerabilities present
than Windows Phone, BlackBerry, and Android combined [9].
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Some of these vulnerabilities are what enable jailbreaking, while others are
used simply to attack the phone. Moreover, jailbreaking itself lends a device
to attacks more easily. The existence of an untethered jailbreak implies that
the device is susceptible to boot-time code injection independently of an
attached host device, at least after the initial exploit is executed against the
phone in the first place.
2.2.1 Stock iOS
Attacks against a smart device running iOS can range from the simple to
the sophisticated. The first class of attacks, and the simplest, are not truly
active attacks at all; they simply take advantage of the fact that the entire
user data partition is available over the data connection. These attacks take
the form of data theft. Because iOS and iTunes support synchronizing of
emails, contacts, and calendars along with photographs, music, and videos,
all of this information is freely accessible to any host computer an iOS device
is connected to, regardless of whether or not the device is locked with a
PIN. Also, because the AFC service is separate from the mobilesync service,
reading from the filesystem does not trigger the on-screen synchronization
notification, leaving victims totally unaware that all of their personal data is
being copied directly off of their phone.
The next level of attack is slightly more active, and is not aimed at the
smart device itself. Rather, it is targeted at any host computer the device
normally synchronizes with. Similarly to reading, it is possible to write data
to the user partition via the AFC service without triggering any alerts to
the victim. It is also possible to perform mobilesync’s job manually, regis-
tering new files with the device by manipulating Apple’s .plist files directly.
This was tested experimentally by connecting an iPhone 3G and an iPhone
4 to a compromised virtual machine running Linux. Upon connection of the
iDevice, a ringtone was copied to the device and registered with the system
manually, bypassing the use of mobilesync. No data transfer or synchroniza-
tion notification was given; the only way to tell that anything had been done
was to look at the list of ringtones and observe the presence of a new one. A
naive attacker may plant a link to an infectious website and hope that the
victim will follow it. A sophisticated attacker will copy an existing file, such
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as a document or a photograph; embed a virus or trojan within it; and copy
it back to the device, overwriting the original so that a file which the victim
has every reason to believe is valid and supposed to be there is in fact a piece
of malware waiting to be executed. This may be done over either the AFC
or PTP communication channels, although doing so over PTP requires ma-
nipulation solely of image files where doing so over AFC allows the attacker
to target any type of data file present on the device.
A minor next step up the ladder of attack sophistication keeps the same
target of a victim’s host computer, but applies to devices which implement
the USB mass storage device protocol rather than the PTP protocol, such as
the iPad [6]. USB mass storage devices encompass such devices as memory
sticks and external hard drives, and as such are capable of executing com-
mands as soon as they are connected to a host via autorun. While some
anti-virus software will disable autorun on mass storage devices specifically
to guard against this sort of attack, not all do, and not all host computers
run anti-virus software in the first place. If autorun is not disabled, then
any executable file can be made to run as soon as the compromised device is
connected, allowing the immediate execution of malware.
The final class of attacks aims at the smart device itself. Apple attempts
to guard against malware being installed on an iOS device by sandboxing
applications and requiring each installed application to be signed with a valid
Apple developer ID and bound to that specific device. There is, however,
a way around these precautions, which is the Apple provisioning profile,
used for developers to be able to push builds of their own applications to
their own devices prior to release for testing purposes. A malicious USB
charger running a microcontroller or miniaturized computer can deploy such
a profile to a connected device, then install a malware application. This
particular technique has both advantages and disadvantages. Because it uses
Apple-signed profiles, it allows malicious applications to be installed without
jailbreaking the device. However, acquiring the provisioning profile requires a
developer’s account, and only 100 devices may be given provisioning profiles
per developer’s account; additionally, there is currently no automated method
for removing a registered device from a developer’s account. Couple this with
the fact that developer’s accounts cost money, and this attack becomes self-
limiting fairly quickly, at least as pertains to number of devices that can
be attacked by the same setup. Additionally, unlike the previous types of
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attacks, this one requires the screen to be unlocked, at least briefly [10].
While quantity is not a viable option for this attack, though, quality is;
because the user file system is readable, it is possible to assess a connected
smart device for information on the owner. If the owner is judged to be
a sufficiently high-priority target with an unlocked device, a provisioning
profile can be generated and malware installed.
Finally, if none of these types of attacks are sufficient for the attacker’s
purposes, the attacker is left to either target jailbroken devices, or jailbreak
the connected device manually. While most modern jailbreaks require the
device to be rebooted in DFU (Device Firmware Upgrade) mode, there exists
a history of jailbreak techniques employing vulnerabilities present in the iOS
stock software libraries which do not require a device reboot. This includes
the relatively infamous ‘Slide to Unlock’ website which exploited an overflow
in libtiff [11]. Depending on the version of iOS the connected device is run-
ning, it may be possible to silently jailbreak it, at least to the point where
Apple’s digital signing can be circumvented.
2.2.2 Jailbroken Devices
By default, the jailbreaking process installs several additional applications
meant to enhance the usability of the newly available features and facili-
tate the installation of jailbroken applications. One such application is the
Bourne-Again SHell, or bash [12], which is installed along with a default
password of ‘alpine’ for both the normal user account and the root account.
Many users opt to install OpenSSH for ease of remote access and control
of their jailbroken iDevice; however, it is far from uncommon for users to
neglect to change the default password, allowing anyone with an SSH client
and knowledge of the default password to gain full root access to their de-
vice. Since SSH can be tunneled over a USB connection [13], this presents
a vulnerability in the case of a compromised USB charger even if the device
has all wireless radios disabled. Examples of iPhone malware which exploit
this (via wireless communication) have already been found in the wild, in
the forms of the iKee and Privacy.A worms. The iKee worm was largely a
proof-of-concept and fairly benign, disabling the SSH service on infected de-
vices and altering the device wallpaper before attempting to spread in order
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to patch the very vulnerability it exploits. The Privacy.A worm, however, is
actively malicious, stealing the information stored on compromised devices
and giving no overt sign of infection [14–16].
In addition to the vulnerabilities jailbroken applications themselves may
inadvertently introduce, jailbreaking an iOS device provides two primary av-
enues of attack for a malicious connected host. The first is simply a method
for circumventing Apple’s digital signing protocols, enabling the installation
of arbitrary applications and the execution of arbitrary code. This was one of
the grounds under which Apple was fighting the legality of jailbreaking [17];
by circumventing Apple’s signing practices, it becomes possible to install il-
legally downloaded pirated applications without paying the developers of the
software. This same ability allows for the installation of malicious applica-
tions, either as system services running with root permissions or, as in the
case of unjailbroken devices compromised with a provisioning profile, the in-
stallation of what appears to be an innocent or innocuous application which
is, in fact, malicious.
This leads into the second avenue of attack. Jailbreaking a device allows
root access to the operating system itself, allowing many activities and mod-
ifications which are not possible using solely Apple’s development kit for iOS
applications. Legitimate uses of this access are applications such as Win-
terboard, which allows full customization of the user interface; SBSettings,
which allows the enabling and disabling of some system settings without
going through the settings application, as well as the hiding of icons; and
modification of or addition to stock system sounds for notifications. This
same access allows malware authors to effectively rootkit a jailbroken device
running iOS, hiding any trace of their malicious application from the user’s
notice [11].
2.3 Potential attacks
This section covers theoretical attacks which have not yet been observed
experimentally or ‘in the wild’, but which are nevertheless possible and which
may be seen in the future. Since it is all but impossible to predict specific
vulnerabilities, this section will restrict itself to speculating on the possible
targets of exploits, without regard to the precise mechanism or mechanisms
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behind the attack.
2.3.1 Stock iOS
It is likely that any new future attacks aimed at compromising non-jailbroken
iOS devices will focus on circumvention Apple’s protection protocols. The
ability to freely read the user partition, which comprises an entire class of
data theft attacks, does not require additional attacks at this time. How-
ever, the ability to install malware on a smart device with an eye to future
exploitation and data theft does require the ability to install applications on a
connected device, which in turn requires attacks aimed at Apple’s protection
mechanisms. Possible exploits of this type include ways to acquire additional
provisioning profiles, perhaps counterfeiting them or finding a way to reuse
them. It is unlikely, although not impossible, that silent jailbreaks will be
seen as part of an attack in the future, due to the increasing experience Apple
is accruing in blocking potential jailbreaking exploits.
Another possibility is an attack against Apple’s bootloader; such attacks
are the cornerstone of current jailbreak techniques, patching the bootloader
to inject jailbreak code when the device is rebooted. Because firmware update
(DFU) mode can be triggered via standard USB communication, it is possible
to modify system files at boot time on a connected device. Such a process is
time-consuming and obvious to the victim, but still possible.
Attacks which have not been seen used but which are possible today using
existing techniques are primarily of the data theft type, stealing all of a user’s
emails, contacts, and documents for later exploitation in phishing, spamming,
and identity theft purposes. Another possible attack is the aforementioned
targeting of the user’s host devices, either at home or at work, through the
use of infected data files copied to the connected device; this type of attack
has already been seen in the Stuxnet worm, although it targeted USB flash
drives rather than smart devices. Stuxnet employed a vulnerability in the
way Windows handles shortcut files which allowed for the propagation of
infection even if autorun was disabled [18]; this technique could be applied
to infected iOS smart devices as well.
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2.3.2 Jailbroken devices
Jailbroken devices provide a much greater range of possibilities for future
attacks due to the low level root access to the operating system the jailbreak
grants. It is possible to see several different classes of attack against jailbro-
ken devices, depending on the sophistication of the attackers and their end
goals.
The first class of attack is an extension of data theft. It is possible to
insert a recording application into the phone stack of a jailbroken iPhone
and record phone conversations, which can then be sent over either a wire-
less or cellular data connection to a central server. There has already been
work done on using the accelerometer built into iOS smart devices for use
in recording keystrokes [19] as well as using the built-in camera to perform
virtual reconnaissance of a location the attacker does not have physical ac-
cess to [20]. These attacks are classed as potential future attacks because
the proof-of-concept applications have several issues which would need to be
resolved before they become viable threats, but the work is demonstrably
being done. Another proof-of-concept being worked on is the equivalent of a
keylogger for touchscreen-based keyboards, allowing the theft of passwords
and personal information typed into the device itself [21].
The second class of attack is not aimed directly at the smart device itself,
but rather aims to leverage the infected smart device as a malware delivery
vector targeted at one or more host computers. It is possible to modify the
USB device descriptor the smart device presents to a connected host. While
some anti-virus programs disable autorun for devices classed as USB mass
storage device hard disk drives, USB mass storage device CD-ROM drives
are still allowed to execute autorun files. Altering the existing descriptor, or
adding a new endpoint, would allow the infection of a host machine immedi-
ately upon connection to the infected device. Even in the absence of such an
exploit, there are other ways to infect a host machine upon connection [18].
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CHAPTER 3
ATTACKS AGAINST ANDROID DEVICES
Where iOS is one of the most popular mobile operating systems on the market
today due largely to its simplicity and user-friendly interface, Android enjoys
a large market share [22] for the opposite reason. Android is a fully open-
source operating system, with the kernel source code freely available. Many
entirely custom versions of the Android kernel and operating system such as
CyanogenMod are available for many smart devices [23, 24]. However, this
openness and ability to customize comes with a concomitant price in security.
It is possible to gain root access to a smart device running Android over USB,
and it is relatively easy to write a piece of malware which can be installed
and run at the kernel level. Furthermore, Android supports its own brand of
shell over USB in the form of ADB, or the Android Debug Bridge [25].
3.1 USB interface
The USB interface of an Android smart device is an interesting study. The
Android kernel itself is based on a Linux kernel, and is capable of functioning
in both USB device mode (where the Android device acts as a subordinate
USB device for a host system) and USB host mode (where the Android device
acts as a host system, allowing it to support USB peripherals such as input
and storage devices) [26]. USB host is similar to the default USB device
support implemented in a standard Linux kernel; in order for the Android
device to function in device mode, however, Android uses the Gadget package
of kernel drivers, which has built-in support for the device to identify itself as
any number of different classes of device, and is further user-extensible in the
form of kernel modules [27]. This thesis will focus on the most common and
default USB connection types, and will touch on some of the more dangerous
available configurations.
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3.1.1 Default Android
Android has been through several versions at this point in time, and differ-
ent versions interface over USB in different ways. At first, the filesystem of
the device was made visible to the host system as a normal USB mass stor-
age device, similar to a flash drive. This had several drawbacks, including
the need to keep system files and user files on different partitions to keep
users from inadvertently modifying import system data; also, while the unit
was mounted as a mass storage device, any other attempts to write to the
same filesystem would result in data corruption or fail outright, requiring the
device to essentially suspend most processes while it was connected. In or-
der to overcome these problems, Android migrated to using the MTP (Media
Transfer Protocol) interface starting with Android 3.0, Honeycomb [28]. The
Media Transfer Protocol is similar to the Picture Transfer Protocol employed
by iOS, but where PTP is optimized and designed for image files, MTP can
handle various different types and sizes of files more robustly. Because MTP
mode acts similar to PTP mode in that it is a protocol and access to the
filesystem is governed strictly by the USB device, it eliminates the need for
separate partitions on disk and allows the operating system total control over
input and output, eliminating the need to suspend processes while connected.
MTP also offers similar security to PTP, and for the same reason: the files
accessible by the host system are governed by the device and so as long as
the device does not reveal any sensitive files, there is little damage that can
be done over USB.
3.1.2 USB debugging enabled
In order to facilitate application development and to allow ease of commu-
nication and control with an Android device, the Android operating system
supports developer mode. This mode adds an endpoint to the USB de-
scriptor for the Android Debuging Bridge, or ADB. ADB effectively offers a
remote shell via USB, through which data can be transferred, the entire de-
vice filesystem can be browsed, commands can be run, and applications can
be installed or uninstalled [25]. This option is disabled by default; it must
be explicitly activated through the device developer settings menu, which
is itself hidden in recent versions of Android [29]. If enabled, however, it
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grants a level of access greater than that of AFC in iOS devices. Where AFC
grants the ability to read and write the entire user filesystem, ADB grants
the ability to read, write, and execute over the entire device filesystem, in-
cluding system files, with normal user permissions. The only restriction on
this access is that it normally lacks root permissions, and there is no built-in
method for acquiring those permissions. Gaining a root shell requires either
a rooted device, or the use of a local root exploit. The discovery of such
exploits, however, are frequently what allow a device to be rooted in the first
place, and so any device which has a publicly available rooting procedure
may be at risk of being fully compromised via USB in the event debugging
mode is enabled.
3.1.3 Rooted devices
Rooting an Android device does not, in and of itself, present a new or altered
set of USB endpoints to a host system. The primary difference that rooting
a device makes is to potentially enhance the level of access the ADB shell
has. On an unrooted device, the command ‘su’ fails, and it is impossible
to gain root privilege using built-in system commands; on a rooted device,
the command ‘su’ succeeds, although most rooting procedures also install
an application which prompts a user on the device’s screen to confirm or
deny root access. This prompt ostensibly removes the ability to exploit
a connected Android device with root privileges stealthily, although it is
possible to combine such an attack with social engineering techniques and
convince the victim to allow such access.
3.1.4 Custom kernels / ROMs
Because the Android kernel employs the Gadget USB driver to connect to
host devices, there is a staggering array of possible ways for an Android
device running a custom kernel to identify itself to a host. Effectively, a
custom kernel can identify itself as any existing type of USB device, or create
a custom device type which works with a custom driver on the host system.
There are two ways in which this may be accomplished via the Gadget driver.
The first way is to compile the USB driving code into a kernel module,
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which can then be loaded into the kernel like any other module. This requires
shell access, which is available either through ADB or a terminal program
installed on the device itself; it also requires root permissions, which means
this can only be done on rooted devices. The Gadget driver can only support
one such module at a time, however, so all desired device types must be
combined in the same module, the current module unloaded, and the new
module loaded in order to affect the descriptor presented to the host.
The second way is to compile the desired module into the kernel itself.
Because the module becomes part of the kernel, it cannot be unloaded; al-
tering it requires a modification to the kernel itself. While this does have the
drawback of requiring an alteration to the kernel (which will almost certainly
require a reboot of the device), it also has the advantage of not requiring a
rooted device for the new kernel to be flashed. If, however, the kernel is
modified in-place, a reboot is not required, but root permissions are required
to make the necessary changes to the system files. This is the method which
is initially required on most modern Android devices, as the default Gadget
driver is compiled into the kernel by default.
3.2 Existing attacks
While iOS has been found to have more vulnerabilities [9], Android receives
more press regarding exploitation of those vulnerabilities, as well as more
malware targeted specifically against it [30]. Part of this can be traced to the
difference in development environments. Where a developer’s license for iOS
requires payment, the tools to develop an application for Android are freely
available. This, combined with the freely and simply accessible source and
kernel code allow for a much deeper understanding of the internal workings
of the Android operating system, which in turn enables malware authors to
more easily develop malicious applications for the Android platform.
Another cause is the way third-party applications are handled. Apple
and Google both verify applications submitted to their marketplaces (the
iTunes App Store for iOS and the Google Play Store for Android); however,
applications for iOS must bear Apple’s digital signature from Apple’s own
signing authority before they can be installed on a normal device. Android
applications go through no such centralized signing procedure, which enables
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unofficial application marketplaces, and which also allows a malicious appli-
cation to masquerade as a legitimate application much more easily.
3.2.1 Stock devices
Attacks against stock devices, which have USB debugging disabled by de-
fault, again can be classified according to sophistication of threat. The least
sophisticated, once again, takes the form of simple data theft and/or infection
of ordinary data files. However, outside of a few devices which implement
their own non-standard protocols and a few third-party applications, personal
data such as contacts and emails are not synchronized directly between An-
droid devices and host systems; as such, data theft of this type is limited to
those files presented as user data storage. While this is still problematic if a
user keeps personal or confidential documents or other files on their mobile
smart device, the potential damage done over USB is significantly lessened
owing to Android’s preference of cloud-based storage and synchronization.
On the opposite end of the spectrum of threats against the device itself are
techniques which target not Android itself, but the bootloader. Google makes
available as part of its SDK the program fastboot, which allows interaction
with the bootloader over USB. Using this program and other exploits, it
is possible to gain full access to the Android operating system itself. This
access allows reading and modification of system and application files, as well
as installation of new system services and applications (or the replacement
of existing services and applications with infected or otherwise malicious
versions). Because this class of attack grants access to system and application
files, far more user information is potentially at risk, including contacts,
email, and even stored passwords if an application has improper security.
Perhaps the most dangerous part of this type of attack is that with such low-
level access, it becomes possible to install and/or execute normal C binaries
(compiled for the appropriate mobile processor) which run outside the Dalvik
sandbox which normal Android applications are constrained to. The few
drawbacks this type of attack possesses from the point of view of the attacker
are that dumping the entire system contents is a time-consuming process (a
problem exacerbated by the increasing size of storage available in such devices
combined with the relatively slow increases in access speeds for that memory)
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and the fact that some steps of the attack are obvious to anyone who observes
the screen of the device while it is occurring [31].
Going in the other direction, attacks by compromised stock Android de-
vices against a victim’s host computer are also potentially a severe problem.
The simplest such attack simply involves running a version of Android which
communicates by enumeration as a USB mass storage device rather than
using the Media Transfer Protocol; such devices are vulnerable to the same
autorun exploit some iOS devices are susceptible to. Some versions of An-
droid allow the user to switch between using MTP mode and mass storage
mode as a matter of convenience, which broadens the pool of potential victim
devices [32].
The more complicated attack types leverage similar or identical vulner-
abilities as the bootloader attack. Once access to the system files or root
access is gained, it becomes possible to alter the USB endpoints presented to
a connected host device. Because the Gadget driver allows complete speci-
fication of the behavior of the driver on the side of the mobile device, it is
entirely feasible to present the compromised device as something it is not,
and to engage in malicious behavior after it is bound to the host with the
(in)appropriate driver.
One attack would be to mimic a human-interface device such as a keyboard
or mouse [31]. Another such attack would be to mimic a USB CD-ROM
drive backed with an ISO image containing an autorun file which would in
turn execute a malicious binary; there is already software available which
can perform similar tasks with the innocuous goal of allowing the use of
an Android smart device to serve as bootable media for system recovery
purposes. This application depends on mass storage mode already being
installed and enabled in the system kernel [33], but attacks which allow doing
so are well known.
The last class of attacks against stock Android devices involves those
which, for one reason or another, have USB debugging mode enabled. While
under normal circumstances the Android operating system requests user con-
firmation of actions such as installation of new applications, it is possible to
counterfeit such confirmation using the USB interface itself [31]. With that
safeguard effectively neutralized, it becomes possible to both add and remove
normal Android applications over USB without the victim being aware of it.
This allows the installation of new malicious applications, or the replace-
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ment of legitimate applications with malicious versions. This is much easier
to take advantage of on Android devices as opposed to iOS devices because
there is no signing authority required for Android applications; while Android
applications must be signed, a self-signed certificate may be used [34].
3.2.2 Rooted devices
While it seems unnecessary to devote a separate section to rooted devices
when an Android smart device can be completely subverted with no root
access necessary, a closer look at that particular attack highlights one po-
tentially fatal drawback from the perspective of an attacker. That attack
is aimed first at the bootloader and requires not only a device reboot, but
potentially several minutes of uninterrupted access. While it is not unrea-
sonable to make the assumption that a victim will believe the reboot to be
an innocent malfunction on the part of the phone or that charging will take
more than the several minutes the attack requires, neither is it an optimal sit-
uation. However, the bootloader exploit is meant to accomplish two things:
first, to enable access to the system via a shell, similar to ADB, and second,
to gain root access. Since rooting a device often requires USB debugging
mode to be enabled, and any user knowledgeable enough to root their device
is likely to have USB debugging mode enabled for their own purposes any-
way, it is well within the realm of possibility that a rooted device will have
USB debugging mode enabled, effectively granting an attacker a root shell
on the Android smart device over USB.
With that understanding, a rooted device with USB debugging enabled is
effectively completely under the attacker’s control. Applications can be in-
stalled, removed, and replaced with malicious copies. System processes run-
ning with administrative privileges can be installed to perform such actions
as sending documents, keystrokes, and user information back to a central
server over covert (or possibly even overt) channels. At this point, the only
two limits to what an attacker can accomplish are the attacker’s imagination
and the need for the attack to remain hidden from the victim, lest he or she
realize the compromised status of their device and perform a factory reset.
A factory reset, however, by its very nature only affects the operating
system itself; the bootloader remains untouched by system updates and re-
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stores unless there is an overriding reason to modify it, because as long as the
bootloader is intact, a failed firmware update can be fixed; if the bootloader
code becomes damaged, the device essentially transforms into an expensive
paperweight. An attacker could conceivably modify the bootloader itself to
re-infect the device on every reboot, and for these reasons a system restore
would never touch the malicious code.
3.3 Potential attacks
Predicting potential attacks against the Android operating system over USB
is difficult due to both the wide variety of Android devices and versions on
the market, and to the wide variety of malicious activities possible once a
device has been compromised. Analysis of existing technologies and attacks
can however give a reasonable indication of the direction from which future
attacks are likely to come.
3.3.1 Stock devices
Since a stock device by default has only MTP mode (or in some cases USB
mass storage mode) enabled, attacks against such configurations are likely to
continue to seek out other, more vulnerable points of ingress. Existing attacks
target the bootloader, which most normal users never realize is a possibility.
However, the attacks seen thus far exploit the bootloader directly to gain
root access as soon as the device is connected. A potential future attack
is to plant malicious code in the device’s memory using the default data
connection (or, more likely, on any memory card installed in the device at
the time, since the MTP protocol as implemented on Android grants access
to the memory card’s root directory) and then to patch the bootloader so
that the added code is executed the next time the device is rebooted. A
user is unlikely to notice that the device reboot cycle is taking an extra few
seconds, which would be all that is necessary to install a back door into the
device.
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3.3.2 Rooted devices
Since attacks against rooted devices are as varied as the tasks which the
processor the device is equipped with can accomplish, speculation on this
particular area will be restrained to the particularly novel. In this case,
that comprises a class of attacks which allow modification of the kernel itself
without requiring the flashing of a new kernel (a task which necessitates a
device reboot). There is a tool developed for Linux systems called Ksplice,
which is designed to allow kernel patches to be applied in-place, without a
system reboot, in order to make regular system updated more palatable to
end users [35]. Because Android is a Linux-based operating system, it is
theoretically possible to port Ksplice to Android.
Ksplice applies patches in a process which consists of two primary tasks.
The first analyzes the patch to be applied in the form of source code and
compares it to the existing kernel, then compiles the patch and appends it to
the appropriate area of the kernel. The second tool temporarily freezes exe-
cution of all programs other than Ksplice itself, goes to the areas of compiled
kernel code the patch deals with, and replaces the patched code with a long
jump to the patch code. It also ensures the return at the end of the patch
code will jump back to the appropriate assembly instruction in the original
kernel code; if the patch code does not possess a return statement, the long
jump is simply inserted at the end of the new code.
The development of the first step is primarily to allow ease of automation
across a number of kernel patches and versions. While the Android operating
system does indeed possess a large number of kernel versions, an attacker
intent on employing Ksplice or a similar kernel modification tool will only
be concerned with a small number of areas of kernel code. Because the
Android kernel is open source, and many device manufacturers make the
code for the modified kernel which runs on their devices publicly available,
manual analysis of the necessary code to be inserted is feasible, especially if
an attacker chooses to pursue a small number of potential target devices.
Creation and testing of a Ksplice-like tool and the patches it generates and
applies is made far simpler by the existence of two other tools. The first is
the set of cross-compilers made available by Google for the express purpose of
allowing developers to create native binary applications and services that run
outside of the Dalvik sandbox normal Android applications are constrained
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to. These cross-compilers enable development on a normal Linux worksta-
tion. The second tool is a set of freely available virtual machine images of
several different versions on the Android operating system [36]. By using a
virtual machine of an Android device, it is possible to take a snapshot of
the current state of the system, test a kernel modification, and revert to the
snapshot in the event the modification renders the kernel inoperable. This
allows the testing of in-place kernel patching neither the risk of permanently
damaging a physical device nor the tedium of restoring a kernel image onto
a malfunctioning device.
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CHAPTER 4
ATTACKS AGAINST WINDOWS MOBILE
DEVICES
This section will address the USB characteristics of both Windows Phone 8
(Microsoft’s latest smartphone operating system) and Windows 8 RT (Mi-
crosoft’s latest tablet operating system, designed for use on mobile processors
such as the Tegra). The decision to focus on Windows mobile operating sys-
tems rather than the more established BlackBerry family of smart devices
was made due to the rapid growth of Microsoft’s platforms in the market [37],
as well as the lack of a BlackBerry-based tablet computer. While Windows
Phone 8 may not command the same market share as iOS or even Android,
it is making strong inroads at a rapid pace, and even Apple has been forced
to admit that certain Windows Phone devices surpass their own offerings in
popularity at times [38].
4.1 USB interface
While Windows Phone 8 and Windows 8 RT are different operating systems,
both are optimized for use on a mobile device, and those mobile devices
possess USB connectivity. Therefore, both operating systems are potentially
vulnerable to a compromised USB charging station. Since they are distinct
platforms, this thesis will investigate each separately.
4.1.1 Windows Phone 8
The USB interface for Windows Phone 8, like modern versions of the Android
operating system, enables transfer of data between the device and a host
machine using the Media Transfer Protocol. Unlike Android, however, there
is no USB debugging option available for this operating system; the MTP
interface is the only USB interface the device provides.
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4.1.2 Windows 8 RT
As anemic as the USB options on Windows Phone 8 are, the USB connec-
tivity for Windows 8 RT are fewer still. Windows 8 RT does not function
in USB device mode at all; the USB connectivity on this platform is limited
strictly to serving as a USB host. In many ways, Windows 8 RT is a desktop
operating system with a user interface optimized for use with touchscreen de-
vices such as tablets, rather than an operating system designed specifically
for use on mobile smart devices. This does not, however, render Windows 8
RT immune from USB-based attacks; it merely means that an attacker must
present their USB connection as a subordinate device rather than as a host
system.
4.2 Existing attacks
For a variety of reasons, including but not limited to the relative newness of
the operating systems; the lack of sophisticated USB connectivity; and the
closed-source nature of the operating systems, USB attacks against Windows
mobile devices have yet to come to light. This does not mean that none are
possible, or that none have occurred, however. Using current knowledge,
with little or no additional effort or research, certain existing attacks can
still be leveraged against these devices.
4.2.1 Windows Phone 8
As Windows Phone 8 supports the Media Transfer Protocol for transfer of
data between a host and the mobile device, any of the previously mentioned
attacks involving MTP are valid here as well. Attacks which leverage the
mobile device as a malware delivery vector by infecting data files on the
device itself are more likely to be successful, however, as Windows Phone
8 is designed to integrate well with Windows desktop operating systems,
which are by far the most common target for malware. Because the only
USB endpoint Windows Phone 8 reveals to a host is the MTP data transfer
interface, no other novel attacks are feasible ‘off-the-shelf’.
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4.2.2 Windows 8 RT
While the other sections in this thesis refer to attacks from a malicious USB
host to a potentially vulnerable USB device, this is not an option against
Windows 8 RT. However, those sections dealing with infecting a mobile device
as a vector to then infect a host system are relevant here as well, since due to
the nature of Windows 8 RT, a victim who connects a Windows 8 RT tablet
to a compromised USB outlet has essentially brought their host system to the
attacker, cutting out the middleman of the infected mobile device altogether.
There is a fair amount of work that has already been done with regards to
compromising a host system with a malicious USB device, much of which is
relevant to this platform.
Windows 8 RT is effectively Windows 8 designed to work on mobile CPU
architectures. As such, the device drivers must be compiled specifically to
work on the different architecture, which means that existing USB attacks
will require some alterations. However, while the specifics of any given ex-
ploit may change, the high-level procedure of masquerading as a legitimate
device and then exploiting known security vulnerabilities in the driver for
that device remain the same. It is already known that various attacks such
as heap overflows are possible given the correct USB device and correspond-
ing driver [39]. The Gadget driver present in Android which allows the device
to emulate any type of USB device can be implemented on a Linux-based
USB controller posing as a USB charging station, and as such a malicious
station can take advantage of any USB device driver vulnerability discovered.
This class of attacks is problematic to develop for Windows 8 RT for one sim-
ple reason: because Windows 8 RT is compiled for a different architecture,
normal Windows binaries will not run on it. This means that debugging of
exploit code must be done using a remote connection to a debug service.
While this is far from insurmountable, it does make an attacker’s task more
difficult.
4.3 Potential attacks
Because Windows Phone 8 possesses only a Media Transfer Protocol interface
and Windows 8 RT has no USB interface wherein the mobile device serves as
a device rather than as a host, any potential attacks will likely be the result of
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one or more of three possibilities: first, that there is an unknown vulnerability
in the existing protocols or connections that will be discovered; second, that
a future update will introduce a new communication channel which will be
vulnerable; or third, that a future update will introduce a vulnerability in
the existing communications channels. The third possibility would seem to
be most likely, given Microsoft’s history of vulnerability patching.
4.3.1 Windows Phone 8
Potential future attacks against Windows Phone 8 are likely to be the result
of an update to the functionality of the USB connection on the device. Both
iOS and Android allow for USB-enabled debugging of applications, which is
a feature that makes development of platform-specific applications much eas-
ier. The relative newness of the Windows Phone 8 platform means that the
application store for this operating system has fewer programs available than
its competitors, and allowing USB debugging would be one way to encourage
developers to close the gap. However, as has been pointed out elsewhere in
this thesis, USB debugging mode brings with it a host of potential vulnera-
bilities, up to and including vulnerabilities severe enough to allow the mobile
operating system itself to become compromised.
Another possibility would be the introduction of USB-based firmware re-
covery. As it stands now, a hardware factory reset can be performed on a
Windows Phone 8 device with nothing more than a power source to ensure
the recovery process is not interrupted by loss of power [40]. If USB flashing
of the operating system is ever enabled, it will present a viable avenue of
attack which has the potential for total system compromise.
4.3.2 Windows 8 RT
While Windows 8 RT is no more vulnerable to USB-based attacks than a
normal installation of Windows 8 on a normal host system, indirect attacks
against a host system are still possible. It is conceivable for a compromised
USB charging station to pose as a USB device and exploit a vulnerability in
a USB device driver on a Windows 8 RT tablet. That exploitation could in
turn be used to install malware which can then in turn infect other systems.
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The precise mechanism behind that infection could be through wireless com-
munication with a home or workplace network, or by infecting USB memory
drives used to transfer files between the tablet and a host system.
Of course, the same possibility for future attacks through expanded USB
capabilities possessed by Windows Phone 8 also applies to Windows 8 RT.
Should Microsoft release an update which adds USB device-mode functional-
ity to Windows 8 RT, associated vulnerabilities will almost certainly follow.
Even something as simple as adding an MTP interface would then make
the device vulnerable to the same types of data theft and malware infection
attacks as other popular smart device operating systems.
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CHAPTER 5
COMPARISON
All mobile smart devices have certain commonalities, which are forced upon
them by the purposes they must fulfill. One of those commonalities is the
ability to copy data both to and from them; this ability, which is necessary for
these devices to function as personal communications and media platforms,
also forms the crux of their vulnerabilities to malicious USB connectivity.
Additional connectivity, no matter how benign or beneficial the intended
usage, also brings with it additional risk regardless of the specifics of the
device in question.
5.1 Attacks common to all platforms
The one form of USB connectivity common to all three investigated platforms
(counting Windows Phone 8 but not the tablet counterpart Windows 8 RT)
is access to user documents, photographs, music, and videos. Therefore, any
attack designed to take advantage of this functionality has the potential to be
successful against any herein studied smartphone, regardless of the specific
operating system that device is running.
5.1.1 Data theft attacks
Data theft-type attack risks are serious across all platforms. This is because
all platforms offer relatively easy access to user media with no precautions
taken to ensure the identity of the connecting host device, or indeed whether
the USB connector is attached to a host device at all rather than the ex-
pected innocuous charging station. However, between the three investigated
platforms, iOS has the dubious honor of boasting the highest risk, owing
to the ability to synchronize not just personal media and documents but
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emails, contacts, and internet bookmarks as well; all of these become poten-
tial targets for theft along with the standard documents and media which
are equally at risk regardless of device type.
5.1.2 Phone to computer attacks
Where the ability to read user data enables data theft attacks and a potential
breach of privacy, the ability to both read and write data creates the possi-
bility of significantly greater mischief. The addition of malicious files, or the
infection of existing benign files, engenders the possibility of using an infected
smart device to spread a worm or trojan to host systems, either at home or
at a workplace. Because this attack can originate from any malicious USB
connection, a possible (and disturbingly plausible) scenario is as follows: a
teenager on vacation with her family takes several pictures with her phone’s
camera. At the airport on the way back, she plugs her phone into a charging
station which has been compromised by an attacker; the microcomputer hid-
den in the charging station makes a copy of all her data for later mining, and
infects several with a novel worm designed to bypass antivirus software. She
returns home, and connects her phone to her personal computer; she then
views the photographs on her phone, infecting her computer with a worm.
The worm spreads over her family’s local area network, infecting all com-
puters it encounters. Her father, a government contractor, plugs his phone
in to his computer to synchronize and charge it; the worm on his personal
computer acts as the compromised USB charging station did, and infects
files on his phone with the same worm, this time targeting a presentation he
is to give to his manager. When he accesses his presentation at work, the
worm on his phone infects the entire local area network at his workplace,
compromising government contracts and secrets.
While this is a worst-case scenario and makes several optimistic assump-
tions (from the perspective of the attacker), it is nevertheless possible, and
only a single example of how blind trust of USB outlets can have disastrous
security implications. Of particular interest is that, by infecting a trusted
home network, any defenses aimed at preventing infection from covert sys-
tems such as compromised USB chargers are completely circumvented by
turning trusted systems into assets of the attacker. While this scenario, and
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others like it, are possible on any of the three platforms, the greatest risk
is to Android and iOS devices, each for different reasons. Android devices
are at greater risk because of the possibility of reconfiguring the device it-
self to bypass protections through subversion of the operating system and/or
bootloader; iOS devices are at greater risk because of the greater variety of
user data available to manipulate. A possible attack iOS enables is manipu-
lation of internet bookmarks to redirect to malicious websites; they need not
even directly attack the user’s computer, but enable cross-site scripting or
cross-site request forgery attacks for further data theft.
5.2 Attacks common to Android and iOS
Windows Phone 8 has only the MTP data connection for a USB interface; as
such, the already discussed attacks are the only attacks that platform is cur-
rently known to be vulnerable to. Android and iOS, however, have expanded
USB functionality, with attendant vulnerabilities. One such vulnerability is
an extension of the data theft attacks all devices are vulnerable to. Where
Windows Phone 8 and the default PTP/MTP interfaces on iOS and An-
droid offer access only to the user’s data, the additional connectivity present
in iOS and Android allows for a complete imaging of the entire device, in-
cluding the system files. This allows such data as hidden files and encrypted
stored passwords to be compromised in addition to the user’s personal files.
The most severe vulnerability they have in common, however, stems from
the ability to install new applications over USB; additionally, this vulnera-
bility is similarly exacerbated in both types of device by the ability to escape
the restrictions manufacturers place on what can and cannot be done with
the device. Rooting and jailbreaking add a new aspect to an already serious
vulnerability.
Because data can be read from these devices and programs can be installed
to them, even on unmodified stock systems it becomes possible to replace a
legitimate application with a malicious one which can have behaviors ranging
from the annoying (such as inserting advertisements) to the intrusive (such
as stealing personal information and redirecting websites) to the destructive
(such as deleting personal files, over-using limited resources such as cellular
data, or sending false messages from accounts on the device).
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While certain safeguards must be overcome to install applications on un-
modified devices, techniques already exist (and have been discussed elsewhere
in this thesis) for circumventing those safeguards. Furthermore, it is far from
uncommon for these devices to be modified to allow a greater degree of con-
trol over the system substrate for the user; these modifications also allow
a greater degree of control for an attacker. A jailbroken iOS device allows
Apple’s application signing requirements to be completely bypassed, while
USB debugging mode on an Android device allows the arbitrary installation
of applications without the need for an additional exploit. Without a doubt,
though, iOS is at greater risk for this type of attack simply because unmod-
ified devices allow applications to be installed with no additional exploits
required, provided the attacker is in the possession of an Apple developer’s
license.
5.3 Attacks unique to a single platform
While Android and iOS both offer similar functionality in terms of user ex-
perience, they arrive at the same location via very different routes. This
difference manifests in many ways, but of particular interest here is the dif-
ference in USB connectivity and what implications that difference has for
device security. Attacks unique to each family of devices are enabled by the
uniqueness of their USB interfaces.
5.3.1 iOS
The unique USB interface possessed by iOS is the proprietary Apple File
Connection link, which allows synchronization of a wide variety of personal
information and access to the complete device filesystem. This access is
not, in and of itself, completely unique, as a similar level of access can be
gained to Android devices; however, unlike Android, this vulnerability exists
on completely unmodified, out-of-the-box devices with no actual exploits
necessary. Connection of any iOS device to a compromised USB port can
result in unauthorized access to email accounts, internet bookmarks, and any
data stored by applications on the device such as stored encrypted passwords
for internet browsers or social media services.
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5.3.2 Android
While both Android and iOS allow USB interaction with their respective
system bootloaders, iOS frequently patches and updates their bootloader
code in an effort to defeat jailbreaking. As such, bootloader attacks are far
more likely (and likely to be successful) against Android devices. Indeed,
one such exploit has already been published [31]. Additionally, the open-
source nature of the Android kernel (and the extensive Android modification
community) makes it uniquely vulnerable to attacks which involve partial or
complete reconfiguration of the kernel; these attacks are made even easier by
the fact that the Android kernel is based on the Linux kernel, which means
skills at working with the Linux kernel and Linux kernel coding resources are
applicable, reducing the necessary learning curve for any would-be attacker.
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CHAPTER 6
MITIGATION
While there are a sizable number of attacks against all modern mobile smart
devices, there are ways to reduce the risk of using untrusted USB charging
outlets. There are three primary categories of these mitigation strategies:
methods implemented in software, methods implemented in hardware, and
modification of user behavior. The first category is perhaps the best from
a deployment standpoint, as developers can implement and push out these
changes as a normal update without requiring any additional effort or expen-
ditures from the end users. The second category often results in the greatest
security when the attacker is limited strictly to dealing in software; however,
it also causes users to incur the expense of the additional or new hardware
and so is difficult to get adopted. While the last category is traditionally one
of the most difficult security strategies to implement, it is becoming increas-
ingly necessary in the modern world. Still, any or all of these options can
present effective mitigation possibilities, and so this thesis will explore all of
them.
6.1 Software-based mitigation techniques
Many software-based mitigation techniques exist for other types of threats,
such as malware being installed through application marketplaces; some of
these techniques can be extended or modified for use as protection against
malicious USB connections. Different types of USB connectivity, however,
can require alternate security solutions.
The connectivity all smartphones investigated in this thesis share, how-
ever, can benefit from the same solutions. Each solution addresses a specific
problem or type of threat. The first threat common to all devices is that
of data theft. Use of the MTP or PTP communication channels by covert
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USB hosts to steal personal information can be solved simply by prompting
the user to verify that they wish to connect to the host; if the USB outlet
the device is connected to is not meant to have connectivity, the user will
immediately know something is wrong. This feature is already present in
iOS 7 [10]. However, concomitant with this approach is the need to ensure
that user acceptance cannot be counterfeited, as is currently possible with
Android [31]; otherwise this protection does nothing more than engender a
false sense of security. Another concern is those devices which have been
jailbroken, rooted, or otherwise altered to allow modification of system files
and settings; it would be possible for an attacker to use this access to remove
the prompt altogether if done quickly enough (or if the user is not paying
sufficient attention).
The second threat related to this connectivity is that of infection of per-
sonal files for use as an infection vector against other systems. One possible
solution to this would be to take advantage of the increasing processing power
and memory of smart devices and run an anti-virus scan on every user file
on the device in real-time as they are modified, similar to on-access scan-
ning present in anti-virus software for personal computers. Android already
supports a wide variety of anti-virus applications in the official Google Play
store [41]. These applications are meant to guard against installation of mal-
ware, but could easily have their scope enhanced to include user data files
as well. This is not a perfect solution, however, as many mobile anti-virus
applications fail to recognize some known threats [42], no anti-virus software
is proof against unknown threats, and any anti-virus software will impact the
performance of either the device itself or the device’s battery life, particularly
if running an on-access service.
Another safeguard against this type of attack is to ensure the integrity
of the user’s data. Requiring user confirmation of any file transfer opera-
tion, either to or from the device, if instituted and used correctly, would
prevent unauthorized modification of personal files. However, this is not a
user-friendly approach, particularly if the user performs data transfers fre-
quently. It is likely that if this feature was instituted and made optional,
many users would disable it; if the feature was not made optional, those
platforms such as iOS and Android which can be made to support modifica-
tion of the operating system will likely see modifications aimed specifically at
disabling this feature. This brings up another problem: where a prompt to
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accept a connection to a USB host would appear almost immediately upon
connection to a compromised USB charger, requiring any circumvention to
be very prompt, malicious modification of user data is initiated at the behest
of the attacker, and so can be delayed until the user is more likely to not be
paying attention; this would allow more time for circumvention techniques
to be applied, making this method less effective.
6.1.1 Techniques for iOS
The specific USB interface unique to iOS devices is the Apple File Commu-
nication link, which is a proprietary communications protocol that requires a
specific driver implementation. Because of this, it is well within the bounds
of possibility to alter the interaction between device and host in such a way
as to protect against security threats. Perhaps the best way to do this would
be to pair an iOS device with a host system, similar to the way Bluetooth
devices are paired; after pairing, the device can only communicate with that
specific host, and the pairing must be canceled before the device can be
synchronized with any other host. If this is enabled with a cryptographic
signature, perhaps tied to the device owner’s Apple ID, it becomes infeasible
for an attacker with space-limited hardware (as in the case of a compromised
USB charging station) to circumvent this protection, assuming the attacker
is unable to employ the USB connection to cancel the pairing.
As this option would restrict the communication possibilities of an iOS
device to a single host system, and a user may very well desire to synchronize
such a device with multiple systems, an alternative would be to require device
pairing with a certain maximum number of host systems. This number could
be as low as two (for a personal desktop and a laptop for traveling), or as
high as five, the maximum number of iTunes installations which an Apple
ID may be associated with. Allowing multiple pairings, however, introduces
the threat of a compromised USB outlet initiating a pairing with a device
which has not yet reached its maximum number of partners; therefore, if
this option is pursued, it becomes necessary to design the pairing procedure
in such a way as to absolutely require user knowledge and interaction for a
pairing to be successful.
Another vulnerability is the use of false or fraudulent information to ac-
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quire an Apple provisioning profile to be used to install unsigned malicious
applications. While pairing will stop this attack by the simple expedient
of not allowing the installation of any applications from an untrusted host,
there is a way to prevent this particular attack in software without resorting
to that specific strategy. The provisioning profile attack works because it as-
signs the debugging permission to the application, and registers the device as
being used for debugging without any actual interaction with the device aside
from identification [10]; prevention, then, can be accomplished by adopting
Android’s policy of enabling debugging mode on the device in addition to
the existing protocols. If a user must manually enable debugging mode on
their device, then it does not matter if that device is covertly registered for
debugging.
6.1.2 Techniques for Android
The threats to Android systems from a compromised USB device are man-
ifold and severe. One vulnerability, exploiting a feature intended only for
developers and device recovery, allows the subversion of the entire operating
system [31]; another allows full control of the device with no additional ex-
ploits necessary. Each of these vulnerabilities must be addressed, although
software updates alone may not be sufficient in this case. This is because al-
most any successful exploit against an Android device carries the possibility
of granting the attacker complete control over the operating system, enabling
the bypassing of software-based security measures.
The first threat which requires addressing is the bootloader. The ability
to trigger the bootloader via USB enables the complete compromise of a
stock Android device [31]; therefore, it becomes of paramount importance
that this vulnerability be patched. The most obvious solution would be to
require a combination of hardware buttons to be pressed in order to access
the bootloader, removing the ability for USB to trigger it. While this will
make legitimate development on the Android platform slightly more difficult,
the security dividends it pays will more than make up for it. This change
would ideally be made to the bootloader code itself, enabling this mode to
be entered even in the event the primary device firmware is corrupted or
damaged.
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The second threat which requires addressing is that of USB debugging
mode, which enables user-level access to the entire device sufficient to install
applications. Perhaps the best compromise between ease of use and secu-
rity is to keep the existing policy which requires user interaction to enable
USB debugging mode, but have that mode automatically deactivate when
the USB cable is disconnected. By requiring USB debugging mode to be
enabled specifically when debugging operations are desired, and automati-
cally disabling it afterward, devices will not be left in debugging mode when
connected to potentially compromised USB outlets. While this may be a nui-
sance to any developer who needs to frequently plug and unplug their device
for development purposes, again, the benefits from a security standpoint far
outweigh the minor inconvenience of a small portion of the user base.
6.2 Hardware-based mitigation techniques
The main drawback to any software-based defense against these attacks is
that a successful attack has the potential to allow a level of access which
enables the attacker to bypass the safeguards. Consequently, while it may
be more inconvenient both from a usability and a cost standpoint, hardware
based threat mitigation has the potential to be significantly more effica-
cious than techniques based in software. There are two primary methods
for hardware-based protections: those aimed at the devices themselves, and
those targeted at the USB connection itself. While both methods can ben-
efit all devices, those methods which require modification of a smart device
would effectively necessitate a user to purchase a new device in order to gain
the security benefits; as these smart devices cost hundreds of dollars, this
thesis will focus on the less-expensive (and thus more likely to be adopted)
technique of safeguarding the USB connection itself.
The main problem with using USB as a universal charging standard stems
from the fact that a USB cable comes with both data pins and power pins.
While it is possible to simply disable the power pins, this is a suboptimal
option as for two reasons. First, it requires a cable or adapter with the
sole purpose of enabling charging while disabling communication; this will
be a problem whatever the safeguard and is more of an inconvenience than
anything else. Second, and more problematic, is that the data pins can
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also be used to negotiate the power transfer parameters between the device
and the charger; simply disabling the data pins could result in substandard
charging performance, and may, depending on the charger, actually result
in damage to the device if an attempt is made to supply more power than
the device was designed to handle. However, it is possible to create a circuit
which enables power negotiation but disables all other data transfer; indeed,
such a cable is already being sold [43].
6.3 User prevention techniques
The final class of threat mitigation techniques is simply user awareness. It
has long been known that the greatest threat to any security system is the
users who must interact with and enforce it; this is one of the reasons social
engineering attacks are still prevalent. Educating users in what to do (and
more importantly, what not to do) when it comes to using USB connections
can be an effective threat management strategy, but only if users can be
convinced to take the appropriate precautions.
The first precaution to be taken is, quite simply, not to trust public USB
connections. Anywhere there is a USB charging station, there are likely to
be standard power outlets, and standalone AC-to-USB power adapters are
readily available, inexpensive, and in some cases actually come bundled with
a smart device. Use of these adapters (provided the adapter comes from a
trusted source; manufacturers of USB picture frames have been known to
ship infected products, so it is a possibility that someone may ship infectious
chargers as well) bypasses any modifications an attacker may have made to
a USB charging station completely.
Other precautions are to not engage in risky behavior with a smart device.
Users who refrain from jailbreaking, rooting, and/or enabling USB debugging
modes are at less risk than those who indulge in such modifications. Users
who do not store personal or private information on their smart device are not
at risk of having that information stolen off of that device. Of course, these
solutions are problematic as many users would consider this to be defeating
the entire point of owning a smart device in the first place.
Finally, if a user must use a public USB charging station, they should be
aware of the normal behavior of their device, and be aware that any deviation
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from that behavior may indicate an attack. Specifically, a device should not
reboot when connected to a power source, and a simple charger should not
register as a connected host system. Any sign that the device is synchronizing
should be assumed to mean that the device is in communication with a host
system, and if no such communication is intended, then something is wrong.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSIONS
The prevalence of smart devices in society is only going to increase. The USB
standard has risen to meet the demand of greater bandwidth, progressing
from standard 1.1 to 2.0 and most recently to 3.0 with theoretical file transfer
rates most modern hard disks would be hard-pressed to keep up with. These
two facts in tandem suggest that USB as a charging standard is here to
stay. Accordingly, it is becoming more important than ever that USB outlets
are not blindly trusted. Malware already exists that spreads via USB [18];
therefore, assuming the trustworthiness of any arbitrary USB outlet is foolish
in the extreme.
The knowledge already exists to subvert a USB charging station with a
microcomputer, and the knowledge already exists to launch a number of dan-
gerous and potentially crippling attacks against smart devices. Furthermore,
the knowledge already exists to leverage those smart devices as a further
infection vector against otherwise adequately protected personal computers
and workstations. These existing attacks underscore the importance of se-
curing devices against hostile or malicious USB connections, which subvert
interfaces meant to be beneficial to the user.
Worse than the existing attacks are the potential attacks which can be
created with sufficient time, effort, and resources. Relatively little work has
been done thus far on USB vulnerabilities in general and smart device-based
USB vulnerabilities in particular, but what work has been done presents an
alarming picture. Wherever there is the ability to transfer data to and from
a device, there is at least the possibility of turning that channel to nefarious
purposes. Even those devices such as Windows Phone 8 which restrict their
USB communication to a sandboxed user data area are not immune.
Of the devices investigated by this thesis, the most vulnerable type is
Android. An attack already exists which grants total control of an Android
device if it is connected to a compromised USB port, and the open source
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nature of the operating system (along with its Linux roots) make finding
vulnerabilities and creating malware targeted at this platform far easier than
for any other.
The next most vulnerable mobile operating system is iOS. While total sub-
version of the firmware requires either a jailbroken device or for the attacker
to effect a jailbreak upon connection, the default USB connectivity grants
sufficient access to the device filesystem to permit a wide range of malicious
activity. The ability to install applications over USB also creates potential
problems in light of Apple’s policies regarding developer licenses.
The least vulnerable of the smart phone operating systems is Windows
Phone 8. This is due largely to the fact that Windows Phone 8 has elected
to simply not use any but the most basic of USB connectivity. Windows
Phone 8 is also a comparatively new operating system, and accordingly less
research has been done into any vulnerabilities it may possess. Nevertheless,
from a USB security standpoint it is currently the most secure option of those
investigated herein.
A special mention goes to Windows 8 RT. While it is not in use on smart-
phones, it is in use on tablet computers, and is the safest of all from the
threat of connecting to a covert USB host. However, Windows 8 RT is still a
Windows operating system, and receives security updates via the same mech-
anism and with approximately the same frequency as its personal computer
counterpart, Windows 8. This means that an attack aimed specifically at
Windows 8 RT, using a microcontroller meant to emulate the behavior of a
USB device rather than a host, has a high probability of being successful.
While the attacks presented and postulated in this paper represent symp-
toms of the problem, the problem itself is complacency; USB outlets are
trusted far beyond what they deserve, especially those in a public setting
which anyone may access. The mitigation techniques presented in this the-
sis are aimed at reducing that trust, both from smart devices and from the
end users themselves. Given that software-based security mechanisms have
always been — and likely always will be — an arms race between attackers
and defenders; hardware-based mechanisms are intrusive, expensive, or both;
and users can always be counted upon to misinterpret, ignore, or forget basic
security precautions, defending against these threats will require constant
vigilance.
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